1. Introduction and summary. In the definition of a two-person zero-sum game given by Von Neumann and MViorgenstern it is assumed that both players know the rules of the game (e.g., the game tree, the information sets as well as the distributions of the ensuing payoffs for given strategy choices, etc.). We use the term pseudo-gane to denote the case where at least one player does not have complete information. 3 In this paper we restrict our attention to those pseudo-games in which player I, say, is only aware of his set of pure strategy choices (assumed to contain m elements: 2 < m < oo ) and not of player II's strategy choices (assumed to have uniformly bounded second moments). Player II is assumed to have complete information. More precisely, we shall study pseudo-games G that have the format given below:
Let A = {al, a , am}j denote the pure strategy choices of player I. Denote by A* the set of probability distributions p over A (player I's mixed strategy choices). We sometimes write p in the form (p (1), * * , p (m) ), '=i p (j) = 1, and p (j) > 0, with the interpretation that when player I uses p he will play aj with probability p (j). Any element of A* that assigns mass 1 to some a ? A will be simply denoted by a.
Let B denote the set (not necessarily finite) of pure strategies for player II. Let 63 be a fixed a-field of subsets of B and denote by B* the set of all probability distributions q over 63 (player II's mixed strategies). We assume that 6( contains all single point sets of B, so that B* contains all finite probability distributions over B. We postulate that we are given for each pair (a, b) in the product space A x B a distribution P(a,b) on the real line which represents the distribution of the loss incurred by player I (or gain by player II) if a e A is the strategy choice of I and b 8 B is the strategy choice of II.
Contrary to the usual practice, the payoff for given pure strategy choices is thus allowed to be random. We do this in order that our main results may be proved in greater generality. An example of a pseudo-game with random pavoffs is given in Section 2.
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The distributions P(a,b) are assumed to have uniformly bounded second moments. For each a 8 A, and fixed Borel set C, P(a,.) (C) is assumed to be 63-measurable. For each pair (a, b) 8 A x B, let X(a,b) be a random variable having P(a,b) as its distribution. Suppose that players I and II are using strategies p and q, respectively. They can determine the payoff of the pseudo-game by first selecting an a 8 A and a b 8 B according to the distributions p and q, respectively, and then treating an observed value of X(a,b) as the payoff.
For every pair of strategies (p, q) that players I and II may use we define the expected value of the payoff R (p, q) by means of the equation4:
We are assuming that player I is only aware of the set A, while player II has complete information. However, by assuming instead that player I is also aware of the set B as well as the distributions P(a,b) , (a, b) 8 A x B, we can associate with every such pseudo-game G a game with complete information G'. Such concepts as "value" and "minimax strategy" do not carry over to pseudo-games. However by the minimax theorem, since A is assumed finite, every such game G' wvill have a value VG and player I will have a minimax strategy p':
infp,A* SUpqeB* R(p, q) = SupqeB* infpCA* R(p, q). Suppose now that players I and II are playing a sequence of identical pseudogames of the type we have been describing; i.e., they play one game, observe their losses and play the same game again (with possibly different strategy choices), continuing in this manner ad-infinitum. We shall refer to the individual games that make up the sequence as the subgames of the sequence. When playing such a sequence of pseudo-games a strategy for player I would be a rule P that would tell him for every j, as a function of his past plays (mixed strategy choices) and losses what mixed strategy to play during the jth subgame; a strategy for player II would be a rule Q that would tell him for every j, as a function of his own, and his opponent's past plays and losses, what mixed strategy q to play during the jth subgame of the sequence. We are thus allowing player II to know what plays player I has made, but we are not granting I the same favor.
Among the rules P available to player I we define a special class of rules to be called rules constant on intervals. If x is any real number let [x] denote the largest integer that is less than or equal to x. For every a > 1, let 11(a) = (Ii (a), I2(a), -, I,(a), .-.) denote the partition on the set I of positive integers defined by the equations:
Forexample,I1(2) = {1},I2(2) = {2,3,4,5},13(2) = {6,7, , 14}; etc. We 4Note that the functions f x kdP(a'. )(x) k = 1, 2 and j = 1, -, in, call be expressed as the limits of finite sums of 63-measurable functions and are therefore also 63-measurable.
shall refer to I,(a) as the nth interval of the partition 11 (a). Note that the cardinality of I, (a) is [ni] . Let us suppose that player I is using some rule P that assigns, with probability 1, the same mixed strategy to the ith subgame as it does to the jth subgame whenever i and j belong to the same interval I. (a), n = 1, 2, 3, * . . In this case we say that P is constant on intervals. Thus if we say that player I is to play a certain strategy p during the nth interval of a partition 11(a), we mean that he is to play p during every subgame whose index belongs to IL(a). The particular strategy that player I uses in the nth interval (a random variable depending on plays and losses occurring prior to the nth interval) will be denoted by pn . Forj = 1, 2, 3, ... , N, * let Xj represent the loss incurred by player I during the jth subgame. Note that the sequence {Xn} is a discrete stochastic process whose index set is the set I of positive integers and whose law of evolution is determined by the distributions P(a,b) and by the rules P and Q that the players use. The first objective of this paper is to prove:
Suppose players I and II are playing a sequence of identical pseudogames G satisfying (i) and (ii):
(i) Player I has m ? 2 pure strategy choices.
( 
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We will show, that is, that the player with incomplete information can do as well asymptotically as he could if he had complete information. The members of {P}m will all be constant on intervals. Our second objective will be to seek a strong convergence rate for N-1 ?N=1 Xj . In the course of achieving this goal we will show that a good partition is obtained by setting ae equal to (m + 2)/m.
2. Examples. A good poker player gains information about an opponent's strategies by observing his eccentricities: his hesitations, his apparent nervousness or calm, the way he holds his cards, etc. Because a player may not be aware of his eccentricities poker is, from this viewpoint, an example of a pseudo-game.
The following is a more concrete example: Consider first a game of matching pennies: players I and II's possible plays being H or T (head or tail). Suppose player I pays player II one unit if the sides of the coins match, and incurs no loss otherwise. A strategy for player I would be a number 7r (O < x < 1), with the interpretation that when he uses 7r he will play H with probability 7r. A minimax strategy for player I would be wr = 2 and the value of the game is ' . Suppose now that player II is a very perceptive opponent and is gaining information from player I's eccentricities. More precisely, let us suppose that player I initiates the game by playing either H or T. After I's play, Nature (a third player who operates as player II's spy) will play either 01 or 02 . We assume that P(01 I H) P(021 H) = 2 aid that P(01 I T) = 1 = 1 -P(02 I T); but this iinformation as well as Nature's actual play in any particular instance will be known only by player II. Player II observes Nature's play and proceeds to play either H or T. As before, we let ir denote a mixed strategy choice for player I. A strategy for player II would now be a pair of numbers (p, q) (O < p < 1 and O < q < 1), with the interpretation that when he uses (p, q) he will play H with probability p (q) if he observes 61(02). (p, q) is known as a test in statistical parlance. Some of the payoffs for given pure strategy choices are random. Thus if player II uses (0, 1) and player I plays H, the payoff will be 1 with probability -and 0 with probability -. For this example the risk function R(r, (p, q)) for player I (his expected loss) can be computed as follows:
Suppose, only for the moment, that player I is also aware of Nature's sample space and of the probabilities P(6i I H) and P(6i I T) for i = 1, 2. Under this added condition, our example becomes a game in the Von Neumann-Morgenstern sense. The value of the game is v = 3 and 7r = 3is a minimax strategy for player I. Player I, by observing his losses over such a sequence of pseudo-games might begin to suspect that he is divulging information to his opponent in one way or another. He knows that r-= is a minimax strategy in the ordinary game of matching pennies, and this fact might lead him to believe that w = would still be a reasonable strategy in the more general case that we have been examining. However, if in this example, player I uses 7r -, then player II can use the pure strategy (0, 1) and we will have:
Now let a and A be two fixed constants. Define the sequence no, ni, n2, nk,
... by means of the equations:
for k = 1, 2, 3, ***
The members of { P} m are determined by two parameters: a and S. An arbitrary member of { P } will be denoted as P (a, 3). We impose two conditions on the parameters:
Restriction (ii) insures that nk -nk-1 is never smaller than 1k . Condition (i) is necessary for the proof that is presented of Lemmas 5.2 and 5.3.
A rule P(a, A) will be constant on the intervals of the partition 11(a). For each interval, player I records the mixed strategy he uses for that interval as well as the average loss incurred by him in that interval. For every interval ny pn (the strategy used in the nth interval) is determined by P (a, 3) in the following manner:
Begin by ordering the elements of Sk (k = 1, 2, 3, ***) in any manner and call the jth member of the sequence pj(k). The members of Sk are called the available probabilities for the kth stage (the intervals numbered nk-1 + 1 through nk). Begin play as follows: During interval j (j = 1, 2, ... *, di) play pf('). During those intervals numbered (P + 1 through ni play any of the available probabilities for the first stage whose greatest recorded average loss incurred in any interval is a minimum. In general, during interval i (i = nk-1 + 1, * * * , nk-1 + bk) play A&-)nk-_lk*During those intervals numbered nk-1 + (bk + 1 through nk , play any of the available probabilities for the kth stage whose greatest recorded average loss incurred in any interval after interval nk-1 is a minimum.
An example may clarify the ideas. Suppose m = 2, a = 2, and According to our rule during the 6th interval he would play p3(1) = (1, 3). Suppose that he does this and that the average loss incurred in that interval is -8. For the 7th interval the indicated choice is again (4, 4) . Suppose he plays p3 (1) in the 7th interval and that the average loss incurred in that interval is 5/2. For the 8th interval he can choose either p3(1) or p5(1), but suppose that he plays p3 (1) again and that the average loss incurred in that interval is 10100. For the 9th interval the indicated choice is now p5(M) or (, 2) And so on, until the 125th interval. Then the whole process begins again; this time using IP2 and n2. He repeats this procedure again and again, ad-infinitum. where c = m2max1jmsupqEB*IR(a1, q)j.
PROOF. Since the distributions P(a,b) are assumed to have uniformly bounded second moments m' maxl<j<m supqeB* IR(aj, q)I is finite and we are able to prove that the function F is Lipschitzian. Assume without loss of generality that F(pi) > F(p2) . According to (4.2) for every e > 0 there exists a q(e) E B* such that F(pi) < R(pi, q(e)) + e. Therefore: PROOF. The proof is straightforward but tedious and will therefore be omitted. As no uniqueness is implied by the lemma, for fixed p eA* we will let gp(k) simply denote an arbitrary element of Sk satisfying d(p, gp(k)) < 2 Although the proof of the main results that is to follow depends on many concepts and is necessarily laborious, the basic idea, which we now outline, is quite simple and intuitive. Consider play within the kth stage only. From (1.2) and (4.2) there exists a p' 8 A* satisfying VG = F (p') = infp,A* F(p). Combining Lemmas 4.1 and 4.2 player I knows that for some available probability gp?, the average loss incurred in any interval in which g(k*) is used will not exceed VG by more than c2 k + Ek (where Ek iS the kth member of a sequence of random variables satisfying P(lim SUpk,o Ek > 0) = 0, as will be shown by Lemma 5.2). Now player II can trick him into using an inferior strategy by allowing him some early wins and then reap the profits temporarily. But the key point is that player I may use a strategy p other than gp) only so long as the average loss incurred in any interval in which p" is used is less than or equal to VG + c2-k + Ek . Since the number of available probabilities for the kth stage is bk, it is clear that player I will not incur an average loss exceeding VG by more than c2k + Ek on more than 4k -1 intervals. To convince oneself of the plausibility of the theorem presented in the introduction, one has only to note that bk = o(nk -nk-l), the number of intervals comprising the kth stage.
5. The proof. Throughout this section we assume that players I and II are playing a sequence of idenitical pseudo-games G having the format described in the introduction and that the value of the corresponding game G with complete information is VG . We assume that player I is using a rule P(ca, /) e {P}m , for some fixed in > 2, as described in Section 3. Except for the discussion of Theorem 5.2, a and A are assumed fixed.
Define the constant Ill as follows:
For p E A*, define G((p) as follows: i.e., if k > k*, then for all y > 0, player I will not incur an average loss greater -k
( 1 2) 12+ky than c2 + n -' on any interval within the kth stage in which gqk is used.
For all y > 0, define the set T(k, -y) as follows: THEOREM 5.1. Suppose players I and II are playing a sequence of identical pseudo-games G satisfying (i) and (ii):
(i) Player I has m > 2 purely strategy choices.
(ii) The distributions P(a,b) have uniformly bounded second moments and for each a e A and every Borel set C, P(a,.) (C) is 63-measurable. Then there exists a class of rules {P}m for player I such that for all rules Q that player II may use we have: P c {P}m =X Pr (lim supNjvO N' ZF= Xj _ v G I, P = 1.
PROOF. Since a and 3 satisfy (3.3) and m is > 2, (5.17) implies that for sufficiently small y > 0 we will have AV(zy) < 1. Thus it is sufficient to prove that there exists a constant K such that for all y > 0 we have:
We lose no generality by assuming that VG = 0 and proving instead that for some constant K and all y > 0 we have: To prove (5.37) it is in turn sufficient to prove the existence of a constant C such that for all k and r (ro ? r < 2ro) we will have:
(5.38) ZS=1 Nj < CNr1.
But ro determines constants C1 , C2 , and C3 that satisfy for all k and rO ? r < 2rO: He will endeavor to prove these results in a later paper. 3. Suppose player II is using a fixed strategy qo E B* throughout the sequence of games and player I is using a strategy P { PIm , as described in Section 3.
Then
Pr (lim sup N1 Z=1 X < infpeA* R(p, qo)) = 1.
Thus every P e { PIm is asymptotically Bayes with respect to qo . If player I uses P( (m + 2)/m, (m -1)/m), then the convergence rate given in Theorem 5.2 is attained. 4. The argument presented in (5.12) can be extended to prove the following generalization of Skorohod's inequality [5] :
THEOREM. Let Zi, Z2 , Z3, X * * be a sequence of random variables. Let Sk = def E jkl Z3 . Let n be a fixed positive integer, X > 0 a fixed constant, and let n * be the first integer k such that ISkl > 2X. Suppose that for some c ? 1 and all k ? n we have P(IS. -Sk| > X In* = k) < c. Then (1 -c)P(maXk?flISkl > 2X) < P(ISnI > X).
PROOF.
P(ISnI > X) k Z , P(n* = k, ISn -Sk ?< X) COROLLARY (Skorohod's Inequality). Let Z1, Z2, Z3, v be a sequence of independent random variables and let Sk -def :j=l Zj. Let n be a fixed positive integer and suppose that for some pair (X, C) of positive constants and all k ? n we have P(ISn -Skl > X) < C < 1. Then P(maxk?n |Ski > 2X) < P(ISn1 > W)/ (1 -C).
5. Convergence problems similar to the one presented here have been studied by Feldman [1] , Samuel [4] , and Van Ryzin [6] , [7] . However in all cases at least a partial knowledge of the payoff function is assumed. Harsanyi [2] has studied the problem of reducing the analysis of a game with incomplete information G to that of a game with complete information G* equivalent to G.
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